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This article describes the characteris-
tics of Eastern Europe as a political pro-
ject. The author considers the genesis of 
Eastern Europe as a political region and 
identifies several periods in its history. The 
author analyses key features of sovereigni-
zation — desovereignization of the region 
and examines geopolitical projects of Inter-
marium. It is shown that Eastern Europe as 
such is an objective reality, whose history 
has not ended. At the same time, the author 
advances and proves the thesis that various 
‘Baltic/Black Sea’ cooperation models aimed 
at isolating Russia act against the interests 
of all participants of the political process. 
A number of methods, including the his-
torical and structural functional analyses 
and the system approach are used in the 
study. The central hypothesis is that, as a 
political project, Intermarium reflects an 
important part of the systemic features of 
Eastern Europe as a political region. Ho-
wever, it is not identical to the region in 
terms of its geography or political region-
alism. The anti-Russian sentiment of the 
Intermarium project is dominant. Yet, it is 
not immanent in this group of concepts. Re-
formatting the Intermarium concept in line 
with the new Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin co-
operation model can be considered a feasi-
ble political task, which requires an ade-
quate scientific solution. Moreover, East-
ern Europe has reached the point of bifur-
cation. The region may become another 
new source of instability in Europe. Inter-
marium projects — a traditional object of 
research — have to be re-evaluated in the 
new political and economic conditions. 
This article is a step in this direction. 
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Different concepts developed in the 
theory of international relations can 
serve as a theoretical framework for 
analysing problems of regional identity 
and sovereignty in Eastern Europe. 
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Such theoretical concepts include those formulated within the transnational-
ist approach. In the theory of international relations, the transnationalist ap-
proach is not homogeneous and, as a rule, falls into three major trends: 
1) the blurring of border between domestic and foreign policies, interna-
tional activities of regions and other objects of federal states, immediate ef-
fect of international affairs on domestic processes; 
2) democratisation of international relations and domestic politics based 
on the achievements of post-industrial revolution and information dissemina-
tion; 
3) modification of traditional approaches to sovereignty. 
In their classical work Transnational Relations and World Politics [1], 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye stressed a sharp qualitative increase in the 
dependence between individual countries, regions, and non-traditional actors 
in economy, politics, and social interactions. While this conclusion sparkled 
a big discussion in the 1970s, today the discussion has shifted to the concrete 
repercussions of the growing transnationalisation of international relations 
rather than the possibility or validity of such an approach. In the late 20th 
century, the perception of globalisation started to change. As L. Fawcett 
notes, the regionalisation of world economy was partly caused by the reac-
tion of states to the devastating consequences of globalisation. [2] Today, 
this position is shared by a number of Russian and European experts viewing 
regionalisation as globalisation on a limited scale. Therefore, a consequence 
of globalisation is its ‘reverse side’ — regionalisation. 
The globalised world of post-Westphalian era is characterised by de-
struction of the state identity — whose key element is sovereignty. The very 
problem of identifying ‘European identities’ gives priority not to the ‘Euro-
pean identity’ per se but to a sum of geographically distanced, culturally de-
centralised, and politically unequal identities. [3] However, modern interna-
tional relations are determined by regionalism. The elites’ subjective under-
standing of basic interests, which are influenced by not only the economy 
but also the cultural code, is replacing the traditional geopolitical combina-
tion of history, culture, and tradition and the classical interpretation of sover-
eignty as the basis of modern international relations. However, despite the 
evident coherence of the so called ‘European values’, they are interpreted 
differently in Berlin and Warsaw. 
Of course, since the 1990s, the ruling elites of Eastern Europe have been 
voluntarily sequestering the quality and number of sovereign administrative 
functions. This process has been especially pronounced in Poland, where the 
renunciation of sovereignty is interpreted in the public consciousness as an 
intentional but extremely heavy sacrifice. 
Latvia and Estonia, on the other hand, adopted a different model, that of 
‘disposing of the ballast’, i. e. the functions that were unsuitable for the 
country. It is important to note that the traditions of sovereignty are not as 
solid in Eastern Europe as in the Western Europe. An obvious exception is 
Poland — a country of sovereignty, even if its sovereignty is absent de jure. 
Modern interpretations of sovereignty are very different. The legal rules 
and understanding of sovereignty dating back to the Yalta-Potsdam system 
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are becoming obsolete. The UN law declaring that all states are equal in law, 
enjoy all the rights inherent in their sovereignty, that territorial integrity and 
political independence of states must be respected, and that the existence of 
sovereign states is guaranteed by current international law and international 
organisations [4], has become a debatable issue for some experts. Others do 
not consider it valid anymore.  
We assume that there is a group of committed supporters of state sover-
eignty. D. Lloyd stresses that abiding by the rules of international law does 
not translate into the dissolution of a state’s sovereignty. In his opinion, re-
strictions are imposed on only international but not domestic activities. [5] 
Michael Walzer, an American political scientist, believes that sovereignty 
follows from the right of peoples to self-determination. Therefore, sovereignty 
is an embodiment of the people’s history, culture, and social patterns. Sover-
eignty is not an inherent property of state, but rather something that has a 
certain national formalisation. [6] 
On the other hand, the idea of erosion of sovereignty is supported by not 
only most lawyers and political scientists but also such ideologist and propa-
gandists as F. Fukuyama. [7] S. Huntington [8], A. Toffler. [9] Z. Brzezinski 
[10], and K. Ohmae. [11] 
A question arises as to why these researchers defending different posi-
tions on almost all problems agree on this one issue. We believe that, attract-
ing public attention to formal disagreements over insignificant questions, 
they serve the same major concept of modern Euro-Atlantic law, which was 
granted the status of international due to historical reasons. This resulted in 
the introduction of the notion of ‘perforated sovereignty’, which has a direct 
connection to the term ‘perforated democracy’. [12] In this context, Russia’s 
political innovation, ‘sovereign democracy’ [13—19], does not read as a tau-
tology. It merely suggests actual sovereignty and a model of democracy that 
is concrete and rooted in history and geography. In the case of Eastern Euro-
pean countries, the discussion about sovereignty is both extremely poli-
ticised and strongly affected by the practices of economic development. 
The loss of sovereignty in CEE does not require special studies. Obvi-
ously, the processes of national sovereignty transformation are different in 
the countries of ‘”old’ and ‘new’ Europe’. This thesis can hardly be chal-
lenged. However, the author continues, ‘This is explained by the fact that 
Central and Eastern European states achieved political independence rather 
recently, which makes it difficult for them to renounce their hard-gained 
sovereignty. [20] An analysis of political processes in Eastern Europe shows 
that some of the states attained certain economic success. However, their 
sovereignty was irreversibly lost. The recent attempts of Hungary and Po-
land to regain some elements of their sovereignty have proven unsuccessful. 
For instance, Camp of Great Poland (OW), a Polish nationalist organisation, 
and the Slavic Union (ZS) organised a series of rallies in Warsaw in 2014 to 
oppose the policies of Polish authorities. The rallies used not nationalistic, 
but anti-Ukrainian and anti-American slogans calling for the regaining of 
sovereignty. [21] Poland revealed itself to be a country that has the right not 
only to declare but also to champion its national interests. The Republic of 
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Poland is claiming the role of a regional leader in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The events of winter 2016 are further prove that. While the Poles do 
not want to sever all ties with the EU, they do not wish to blindly follow all 
recommendations from Berlin and Brussels either. Poland’s position is of 
consequence not only for Hungary but also for Lithuania, Latvia, and Es-
tonia, which are absolutely loyal to European practices. The refugee crisis 
creates a window of opportunities for a Central European Union of a new 
type. However, this requires reaching a balance in relations with Russia. 
The Baltics — as part of the Intermarium and Eastern Europe — are a 
special case. [22] The loss of sovereignty was presented there as a geopoliti-
cal achievement, a civilizational breakthrough. Yes, Prague, Budapest and 
Warsaw willingly passed a significant part of their sovereignty to Brussels, 
but in their case it was only in the Baltics that the loss of sovereignty was not 
accompanied by even a pretence of a real political or economic bargain with 
the European Union. 
Russia is also debating the nature of sovereignty. Different opinions are 
voiced, including those citing integration as an evolutionary step of sover-
eignty. [23] A nation-state refers to a political apparatus, recognised to have 
sovereign rights within the borders of a demarcated territorial area, able to 
back its claims to sovereignty by control of military power, many of whose 
citizens have positive feelings of commitment to its national identity. [24] 
Giddens is right to state that a nation state suggests sovereignty but does not 
guarantee it. This assumption is crucial for our work. We believe that sover-
eignty is a relative concept, changing in time and adjusting to new situations 
and new requirements [25]. 
De facto, Slovakia and even Poland have Western European rather than 
their own sovereignty. However, what are the limits to borrowing and using 
sovereignty from the legal and, more important, practical perspective? The 
CEE version of sovereignty demonstrates the invalidity of the major thesis of 
Euro-Atlantic political mainstream and its Russian advocates, that a connec-
tion between domestic and foreign policy is an attribute of all mature democ-
racies. According to this view, the more developed a state’s democratic insti-
tutions are, the deeper is the connection. [26] Experience suggests that an 
extreme interdependence between domestic and foreign policy is characteris-
tic of countries that have never been and will never be democratic in the 
north-Atlantic understanding of the term. Similarly, in the conditions of in-
creased economic instability holding to the illusion of solving domestic 
problems through achievements in foreign policy leads to major failures. 
There are some who claim that, in Europe and thus Eastern Europe, time 
has contracted and conflict potential has increased. In principle, this is true. 
Stressing the scales and rates of changes in world politics and economy is 
the right thing to do. However, one should also emphasise the extremely 
rapid transformations taking place in CEE. The region has never seen an ‘or-
dinary’ course of political events. 
As a political region, Eastern Europe emerged in the framework of the 
Versailles-Washington system, and it was not an instantaneous occurrence. 
The region’s territorial and political structure was constantly changing until 
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1939 and it continued to evolve after World War II (the First and Second 
Vienna Awards). Having halted the advance of the Red Army under the mot-
tos of a unifying national idea, the army of General Żeligowski occupied a 
part of Lithuania (the Vilnius Region). How did that move fit, exactly, with 
the major thesis of the Polish opponents of the Russian Empire, “for our 
freedom and yours”? 
Although political radicalism in the countries of Eastern Europe did not 
transform into Nazism, Trotskyism, and radical interpretations of commu-
nism, it was a dominant idea for many decades. Probably, only Czechoslo-
vakia managed to preserve a political regime resembling that of French or 
British democracies. 
Was a different development model possible? We believe it was not. 
Historically, Vienna, Saint Petersburg, and Berlin had accumulated a lot of 
experience in managing non-title nations. In times of piece, administrative 
systems of these governed subjects could boast extremely long lives, pro-
vided, among other things, that the capitals of the empires in question would 
cooperate. Fast forward to the World War I, when most of the countries in-
volved proposed both territorial and political transformations. Russia, Aus-
tria-Hungary, and Germany, however, did not take kindly to the idea of es-
tablishing truly sovereign nation states. For example, the 1915 Memorandum 
of the Baltic Council (established by German emigrants from the Estland and 
Liefland provinces of the Russian Empire) stressed that the Narva — Lake 
Peipus line was the border ensuring German military security. This border 
was believed to threaten Saint Petersburg, and lead to its evacuation, moving 
the seat of government, and thus to the administrative disintegration of Rus-
sia. [27] Another important document of the time, the memorandum of the 
German army officer and politician E. Ludendorff, Die Ziele der Deutschen 
Politik, talks of German occupation plans for Eastern Europe. In particular, 
the memorandum stressed that the Entente’s ‘iron ring’ could have been bro-
ken only if Russia had been fully dependent on Germany in political, eco-
nomic, and military aspects and if it had served as a source of Gernamn eco-
nomic and political power. Thus, Germany could have secured European 
leadership, build a foundation for a European-Asian bloc, and become a 
global power capable of opposing the Pan-American and British blocs. Ac-
cording to the Ludendorff’s plan, Finland, the Baltics, Poland, Ukraine, and 
Georgia had to be separated from Russia. The rest of the country’s territory — 
after the overthrow of Bolshevism, of course — had to become a federation 
with ‘close’ economic ties with Germany. [28] However, to implement this 
plan, it was necessary to discuss it with Berlin’s allies. The Chancellor of 
Germany T. von Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the Ambassador to Vienna, 
von Tschirschky, that if Germany was to ensure its victory, it would have 
been necessary to form several buffer states between Russia, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary to push Russia farther East [27]. This approach was forma-
lised in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
In the days of Austria-Hungary and the Habsburg monarchy, the authors 
of such plans prioritized its territorial integrity against the backdrop of 
changes in its administrative and political system — i. e. transforming it into 
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a federation or confederation, a union of territories or an alliance of peoples. 
It is sufficient to recall the projects of the second half of the 19th/the first half 
of the 20th century — Lajos Kossuth’s Danubian Confederation, Felix of 
Szhwarzenberg’s and Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa, Richard Nikolaus 
von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa, and other forms of regional coop-
eration of states [29]. 
However, 1917 and 1918 marked the end of the three empires as political 
projects. The region of Eastern Europe became a political and historical real-
ity, bursting with extremely complicated internal problems. The challenges 
of the interbellum — especially of the 1920s — cannot be attributed to the 
intrigues of Moscow and Berlin alone. 
The region of CEE has its internal sources of conflicts. This is de jure 
recognised in the capitals of Eastern Europe, what conclusions are made 
from this is another question altogether. The years Polish people were the 
subjects of ‘foreign’ empires led to the emergence of a surprisingly lasting 
quasi-imperial complex, which is affecting the policy of the Polish state 100 
years after the Treaty of Versailles. 
In Poland, the idea of a Third Europe, a union of small states lead by Po-
land, had been very popular almost until the German invasion of 1939. The 
British researchers W. P. and Z.K Coates write that, until 1939, Polish gov-
ernments had been preoccupied with planning and developing different vari-
ants of: 
1) fragmentation of the USSR,  
2) creating a bloc of states that would isolate the USSR from Western 
Europe. [30] 
Here is another quote to illustrate our point about the academic and po-
litical discussion in Poland: “Our goal is for the Polish people to unify other 
peoples living between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea, sandwiched be-
tween Russia and Hitler’s Germany”. [31] A Polish military intelligence of-
ficer, Edmund Charaszkiewicz wrote, “squeezed between two extremely dy-
namic colossi, Poland should carefully observe all activities of her 
neighbours”. [32, 33] This was the essence of Prometheism, J. Pilsudski’s 
political concept aimed at weakening Russia (and, later, the USSR) through 
supporting irredentist movements among the non-Russian peoples. Based, in 
part, on the classical Jagiellonian idea, Prometheism adapted it to the prac-
tices of the interbellum. 
In 1926, the Prometheus (Prometeusz) organisation was established in 
Paris. It brought together representatives of Azerbaijan, the Don Cossacks, 
Georgia, the Ideal-Ural state, Ingria, Karelia, Komi, Crimea, Kuban, North 
Caucasus, Turkestan, and Ukraine. [34] This movement was supported by 
the Eastern Institute in Warsaw and Research Institute for Eastern Europe in 
Vilno. An overview of the history of Prometheism was published in Febru-
ary 1940 by the above-mentioned Edmund Charaszkiewicz, who was re-
sponsible for coordinating the Prometheus programme from 1927 until the 
beginning of World War II. 
In 1959, this idea became the basis for US Public Law 86—-90 on Cap-
tive Nations. The Nowy Prometeusz is still published today, still promoting 
the Charaszkiewicz’s cause. An activist of the Confederation of Independent 
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Poland, Andrzej Izdebski put forward a project of the Federation of Peoples 
of Central Europe bringing together 17 states. In view of the city’s signifi-
cance for the peoples of Central Europe, Lviv had to become the capital of 
this federation. [35] 
These approaches were considerably modernised by Jerzy Giedroyc1 and 
Juliusz Mieroszewski2. They argued that the Eastern Dimension (Polish rela-
tions with Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania) were the sublimation of relations 
with the USSR. The existence of socialist Poland and the powerful USSR 
and the fact that the doctrine was written by émigré intellectuals in Paris 
were largely disregarded. After 1991, the expert community started paying 
close attention to the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski concept as a forecast that came 
true. The 2013—2015 showed the concept’s fallacy. Through recognising 
their responsibility for certain episodes of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Bela-
rusian history in the period when these peoples were subjects of Polish 
kings, Poles reduced the animosity of Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belaru-
sians. [36] However, having accepted Ukrainian nationalism, Poland as-
sumed that it would always be targeted at Russia. However, it has become 
evident that supporting local nationalist movements can result in an unpre-
dictable conflict with an unpredictable geographical vector. 
There is a need for a thorough analysis of new and traditional Polish ap-
proaches to the Intermarium. Geographically, the Intermarium can have sub-
stantially different ‘compositions’. However, it is not Estonia or Albania that 
plays the leading role in the project. Historically, geographically, and politi-
cally, the Intermarium project can survive without Ukraine but cannot with-
out the Republic of Poland. One should take into account Polish vision of 
Eastern European problem and search for forms of cooperation based on 
common views, which is not impossible. These common views, however, 
have to be addressed separately in a different article. 
 
*** 
 
Another important issue is the emergence of Eastern Europe as a politi-
cal rather than geographical phenomenon. According to Larry Wolff, until 
the beginning of the 18th century, Europeans divided their continent into the 
Mediterranean South and the Baltic North. The concept of Eastern Europe 
was born only in the era of the Enlightenment. [37] It is difficult to argue 
with such approach. Orientalism as a scientific approach does not suggest 
recognising Eastern Europe as a political reality. 
We believe that geographical reality became political in 1918—1920. 
The second version of Eastern Europe developed in 1944—1956. The disin-
tegration of the socialist system and the USSR in 1986—1991 marked the 
third — but not the last — stage of the region’s evolution. The eastern enlar-
gement of the EU did not result in the dissolution of CEE as a region. [38; 39] 
                                                     
1 Jerzy Giedroyc (1906—2000) was a Polish writer and politician, the founder and 
editor of the Kultura journal. 
2 Juliusz Mieroszewski (1906—1976) was a Polish writer and journalist, a close col-
laborator of J. Giedroyc. 
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The fall of the Soviet system did not change the region’s identity. Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries found themselves in the zone of influ-
ence of another integration project — the European Union. Later, they ac-
ceded to the EU. The EU enlargement had a significant impact on politics 
and economies of CEE. However, it did not affect the peripheral status of the 
region and the particularities of its economic development. 
This is explained by the fact that the Central and Eastern European iden-
tity is not rooted solely in the Communist past.  Some scholars and other ex-
perts consider the Communist period as crucial for the identity formation, it 
does not make much sense from the point of view of history. The era of 
‘world socialism system’ is mere 30 years in the centuries-long history of the 
region. Even in Russia, such interpretations of the CEE phenomenon are not 
rare, as exemplified by the highly interesting works of I. N. Tarasov. [40] 
The studies conducted by S. A. Romanenko are a notable exception. As early 
as 1994, he was writing, “scholars and journalists often consider inter-ethnic 
conflicts in Eastern and Middle Europe to be the legacy of communism, which 
halted the process of national self-determination or, on the contrary, as a result 
of the downfall of the system, once containing ethnic conflicts’ [29]. 
In this context, it is important to stress that the genesis of political Eas-
tern Europe has been studied for a long time. Relevant discussions always 
attract significant attention. In 2007, a remarkable book entitled Eastern 
Europe after the Treaty of Versailles was published in Moscow [42]. It is of 
interest that, on the one hand, it was strongly lauded by the journalists of the 
Svoboda Radio [43]; on the other hand, it did not receive criticism from the 
part of expert community that would consider a compliment from Svoboda as 
a cause for concern. Why was there no discussion? Of course, it is important 
that the work was published in 2007, before the economic and political ordeal 
of 2008—2016. However, the main reason behind the consensus is that the au-
thors managed to capture the key property of the Eastern European region — 
its limitrophe and peripheral nature; a thesis, which almost everyone agreed 
with. The existence of problems in the region was not a debatable issue. 
Another problem is the geographical borders and internal structure of the 
Intermarium. According to Prof. Pál Tamás, the Intermarium consists of 
three zones: 1) the Baltic zone, 2) the Polish zone, and 3) the Southern zone 
(Black Sea area) [44]. A similar position was adopted by A. V. Malygin, who 
writes, “Understanding an international political region as a combination of 
international phenomena observed within certain territorial and temporal co-
ordinates, one can speak of the emergence of a stable phenomenon — ‘new 
Eastern Europe’. [45] This region includes: 1) the three countries of the 
Eastern European flank of the CIS; 2) the border countries of ‘classical’ 
Eastern Europe — Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and their southern neighbours — 
Romania and, probably, Bulgaria; 3) the Baltics — a remarkable component 
of the region. 
In this context, it is important to mention a French/Polish historical 
monograph, A History of Eastern and Central Europe, ed. by N. Aleksiun, 
D. Beauvois et al.. Prof. Romanenko writes of this monograph, “the authors 
of the book have put in a great deal of effort to give a comprehensive picture 
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of the history of countries and peoples of the region they call “Central and 
Eastern Europe”. Technically, the tome in question is the history of Poland, 
the Czech state, and Hungary within historically unstable borders, which 
used to incorporate the territories of modern Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Slovakia, and some other states. [46] “The historical and geographical region 
of Middle Europe consists of two subregions — Central Europe and South-
Eastern Europe, i. e. the Balkans. Before and after the transformation of this 
space following World War I, this region was also considered part of Eastern 
Europe. However, in 1945—1991 the term ‘Eastern Europe’ (coined in the 
17th/18th century) had a very clear military, political, social, and ideological 
meaning”. [47] 
Despite all the efforts, the concept of Central and Eastern Europe re-
mains a contested one. It has not gained a wide recognition beyond the nar-
row circle of its proponents, which can be explained by the artificial nature 
of the term. [46] Zbigniew Brzezinski thus described the international situa-
tion on the territory of the former USSR as “a dozen states, hardly prepared 
for genuine sovereignty (except for Russia) and ranging in size from the rela-
tively large Ukraine with its 52 million population to Armenia with its 3.5 mil-
lion. Their viability seemed uncertain, while Moscow's willingness to accom-
modate permanently to the new reality was similarly unpredictable”. [48] 
The region’s borders are not stable. In the 1920s, German geographers 
and historians introduced the concept of Mitteleuropa (or, sometimes, Ost-
mitteleuropa), which also included their own country. Of course, German 
geopoliticians of the 1920-30s would have never extended the notion to the 
Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus. According to S. A. Romanenko, the 
historical and geographical political region of Middle Europe consists of two 
subregions, Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe, i. e. the Balkans. [47] 
In 1977, the famous German historian K. Zernack considered the termi-
nological problems and suggested interpreting the broad term ‘Eastern 
Europe’ as a special territorial and political system. In later works, he did not 
only revisit the issue but also examined the Polish-Russian relations. [49] 
Therefore, in the late 20th century, following the collapse of the USSR, 
the region ‘enlarged’ to include Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia. The three 
countries support this and consider such affiliation as potential ticket to a 
higher ‘league’. Despite all internal differences, common historical, geogra-
phical, and economic features bring these states together. The transitional 
nature of economy is combined there with the evident incompleteness of po-
litical transformations. The Baltics — de facto members of the Intermarium — 
do not necessarily like the attribution, with a notable case of Estonia who 
now self-identifies (thought its elites) as a Nordic country. 
Further, the very notion of ‘Eastern Europe’ suggests not only certain 
geographical and political features, but also economic particularities. The 
futility of catching-up development and attempts to fit in the Western civili-
sation was demonstrated by the course of Russian history in the 1990s: “The 
“transitional period” was a failure. The world is becoming less democratic 
and increasingly authoritative, although retaining the market economy fea-
tures” [50]. At the turn of 2015, the attractiveness of the Western European 
model is perceived differently than in the beginning of the century. 
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What are the significant features of Eastern Europe within the geopoliti-
cal Intermarium concept? Special attention should be paid to the political 
processes manifested in the transformation of the legal status of borders in 
Eastern Europe. At first, the state borders of the Warsaw Pact and the Coun-
cil of Mutual Economic Assistance turned into boundaries between compet-
ing states. (These states competed in a wide range of areas — from the right 
to be the first to accede to NATO to fighting for the Western market of fro-
zen vegetables). In this context, it is important to recall the agreement be-
tween the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People’s Re-
public on the construction and joint exploitation of a complex consisting of 
two interconnected hydropower plants on the Danube near the towns of 
Gabčíkovo (Czechoslovakia) and Nadymaros (Hungary). The intergovern-
mental agreement was approved and supported by a decision of the Council 
of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1977. In 1988, under pres-
sure from the environmentalists, the Hungarian authorities suspended their 
participation in the project. In 1989, Hungary abandoned it. After the dis-
bandment of COMECON, Slovakia unilaterally diverted the Danube and 
built its part of the HPP in Gabčíkovo, which provoked a conflict. In 1992, 
Hungary lodged complaints against Slovakia with the International Court of 
Justice, OSCE, and the UN Security Council. This conflict made a very 
negative impression on all countries of the region and, what is more impor-
tant, Western European capitals and Washington. 
In this context, one cannot but agree with Z. Brzezinski. The eminent 
geopolitician stressed in The Grand Failure (surprisingly, 100,000 copies of 
a chapter from the book were published in the USSR) that Marxism-
Leninism had failed to predict and take into account the basic forces behind 
the international state of affairs and it had underestimated the role of ethnici-
ty and nationalism [51]. This is true. However, in Eastern Europe, Marxism 
in its concrete administrative form had frozen traditional national conflicts 
for many decades. A new tradition of tolerance and depoliticisation of his-
torical memory emerged, a development warmly welcomed in the EU. Only 
15—17 years later (in 2004), the EU started to build new cooperation me-
chanisms. Large conflicts did not arise in the region over that period (con-
sidering, of course, that Yugoslavia is primarily ‘the Balkans’ and only then 
‘Eastern Europe’). 
The periphery nature of Eastern Europe is not only spatial, but temporal 
as well. “Different Middle and Eastern European peoples often living on the 
same territory were an objective obstacle to their political self-determination 
in accordance with the 19th century classical principle “one land — one na-
tion — one state”. In the East of Middle Europe, the Western European 
model of a multi-ethnic nation-state was replaced by a mono-ethnic state-
nationality” [29]. That is why the high cost of European integration paid in 
political and economic sovereignty was considered justified. 
Territorial evolution of the USSR did change the nature of geopolitical 
projects in Eastern Europe. One should rather speak of a reduction in its ter-
ritorial scope. G. M. Malenkov, commenting on the foreign policy achieve-
ments of the country in 1949, stressed, “Never in the history has our Mother-
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land had such just and well-established state borders. Look at the map. In the 
West, Ukraine has united the Ukrainian people into one family. The histori-
cal injustice of the Belarusian and Moldavian borders has been remedied. 
East Prussia — this longstanding base for attacks against our Motherland — 
does not exist anymore”. [52] This created a new geographical framework 
for the Intermarium project. 
In its turn, the collapse of the USSR returned its former western territo-
ries into the realm of geopolitical projects. In the late 1980s-early 1990s, the 
Belarusian People’s Front and the People’s Movement of Ukraine actively 
developed the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea Commonwealth (BBSC). In 
1994, an agreement was signed by 15 parties from six countries (Belarus, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Ukraine) to form the League of Par-
ties of the Intermarium States. 
In September 1997, a meeting of presidents of CEE countries — Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, 
Finland, and Estonia — took place in Vilnius. The Russian prime minister 
also attended it. Officially, the summit was organised to discuss the experi-
ence of reforms and the concepts of the Baltic-Black Sea transport corridor. 
However, it is important to stress that most participants in the meeting repre-
sented countries striving to accede to NATO and the EU. In Vilnius, they 
attempted to show that the new borders of the Western community are well 
protected, on the one hand, and not hostile to Russia — the country left be-
yond the European structures, on the other.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for Baltic-Black Sea co-
operation was first stressed at a regional summit in Vilnius by the Lithuanian 
president, Algirdas Brazauskas. 
In November 10—11, 1998, presidents of Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania met in Warsaw. 
At official events, it was stressed several times that the capital of Poland had 
welcomed the heads of the states united by the experience of constitutional 
reforms, close political economic cooperation, and common goals of acced-
ing to the Euro-Atlantic structures.   
On August 12, 2015, a press conference on ‘Creating a Baltic-Black Sea 
Alliance’ was held in Kyiv. The Baltic-Black Sea Confederation was estab-
lished in February 2015. Any other approaches, for instance those involving 
Belarus, received severe criticism. Polish scholars negatively interpreted the 
choice of close ties with Russia made by the Belarusian society. They ex-
pressed regrets about the lost opportunities associated with ‘European val-
ues’. [41; 53] 
The ideas of region-building have gained popularity in Lithuania. The 
Lithuanian political scientist E. Nekrašas writes, “continuous efforts to be-
come a regional leader separate Lithuania from Europe”, and then: “in its 
development of the concept of regional leadership, Lithuania paid more at-
tention to relations with Eastern rather than Western neighbours — the key 
EU states — Germany, France, and the UK” [54]. The Ukraine crisis pro-
voked by Lithuania tarnished the European image of the Visegrad Group. 
Europe was disappointed in the four countries. [55] 
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Another key issue relates to the assessment of the Russian factor in the 
development and functioning of the Baltic-Black Sea projects. The analysed 
sources and literature suggest that these political projects cannot be consid-
ered neutral in their attitude towards Russia [56]. The concept of a union of 
Eastern European states requires self-identification, where ‘us’ is opposed to 
‘them’ — imperial, Soviet, or modern Russia. Almost all limitrophes of the 
interbellum were the ‘double periphery’ of Russia and Western Europe. The 
Little Entente and Baltic Entente projects did not turn into effective forms of 
cooperation, partly due to unclear relations with Western Europe. Only in the 
form of Middle Europe, the Intermarium project becomes self-sufficient. 
Without Germany, any Intermarium structure turns into a buffer or border 
area, without either economic or political stability. On the other hand, any 
quasi-union with Germany means the subordinate position of all the other 
members. This option may be acceptable for the Czech Republic, but not for 
Poland. 
The very concept of Intermarium suggests establishing a bloc of coun-
tries and making it possible to be more convincing when negotiating with 
partners than it could be done by and country from Lithuania to Romania on 
its own. In practice, no real project of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation has ever 
been implemented. This is explained by the fact that, at the level of concepts, 
cooperation between the Intermarium states is always presented as an equal 
partnership. Such cooperation should rest on an economic and political union 
with a transitional economy oriented to both the West and the East. How-
ever, a complex of historical, ethnographic, geographical, and religious rea-
sons poses an obstacle to mutually beneficial cooperation. It is sufficient to 
draw one example — the concept of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania trans-
lated into the present day can destroy or weaken any Intermarium project. 
An actual or hypothetical confrontation with Russia is a significant inte-
grating factor. However, it is not sufficient for making the Baltic-Black Sea 
partnership a real economic or political union. The ‘Eastern Partnership’ of 
such surrogates as the Visegrad Group is a proof that the question of an indi-
vidual Intermarium project has been rendered obsolete. A different case is 
the possible project of new Central European integration, probably within 
the EU. The new Polish and Hungarian migration policy can serve as a uni-
fying platform of a new type. 
Social and economic processes observed in Europe suggest that no East-
ern European project will be viable by itself. The cases of political and eco-
nomic construction of regional identity based on the search for a common 
enemy will often emerge and often disappear. The efficiency of Baltic-Black 
Sea projects is limited by economic factors. Regional development in the 
Intermarium was aimed primarily at changing its limitrophe and peripheral 
status. While relevant mechanisms have not been developed yet, there are a 
number of projects for developing transport corridors and infrastructure. The 
economic core of the Intermarium is transport. In February 2014, the Viking 
multimodal railway project connecting Ilyichevsk and Kalipeda was 
launched in collaboration with Belarus and Lithuania in the framework of 
Pan-European corridor IX. 
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Poland plans to construct motorway S19 as part of the Via Carpathia 
transit route. This was announced by the Polish Minister of Infrastructure 
and Development Andrzej Adamzcyk in one of his first interviews in office, 
“Route S19 should be brought to life. S19 will run in the East of Poland 
crossing the country from north to south. It will start at the Lithuanian border 
(Budzisko), run through Suwałki, Białystok, Lublin, Rzeszów, and reach the 
border of Slovakia (Barwinek)”. The Rail Baltica project should be consid-
ered in the same context. [57] 
It can be concluded that the geopolitical changes that occurred in Eurasia 
in the late 1980s-early 1990s gave rise to various models of economic and 
political cooperation. Adapting its forms to current conditions, the Intermar-
ium projects are a factor hindering the development of Eastern Europe as a 
political and economic region. As a historical and political phenomenon, 
Eastern Europe is objective reality and it has all prerequisites for independ-
ent and self-sufficient development. A non-critical combination of objective 
characteristics of Eastern Europe as a region interested in cooperation with 
Russia with the initially anti-Russian concept of Intermarium is especially 
counterproductive in the current conditions. 
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